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1. INTRODUCTION
According to the statistics compiled by the International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry (IFPI), online paid streaming is currently the fastest
growing segment of the recorded music market, with a 33% global revenue
* LucieGuibault is Professor andAssociateDirector of the Law andTechnology Institute
at the Schulich School of Law of Dalhousie University. This article is based on a report
written for the Broadcasting, Copyright and Creative Marketplace Directorate,
Department of Canadian Heritage, Government of Canada.
increase in 2018.1 Subscription-based services offering legal online paid
streaming of music have now reached all corners of the planet. Among the
most well-known services are Apple Music, Amazon Prime, Deezer, Google
Play, Soundcloud, and Spotify.2 The creation and continued functioning of such
services are contingent on the capacity of the service exploiters to clear all
copyrights in the offered music repertoire, for the territory of operation. In
practice, rights clearance for online streaming services proves incredibly complex
and cumbersome, because every musical work available for streaming on a
service is likely to have several right holders: an author, a performer, a record
producer, and a music publisher.3 The number of rights owners entitled to claim
rights on a musical work may even be much larger where that musical work was
composed by multiple authors or performed by a group of artists, each
potentially bound by separate agreements with publishers and record producers.4
For streaming services wishing to offer a global repertoire, it can be a daunting
task to obtain permission for every single musical work, with respect to every
territory. In view of the complexity of the music industry, fears of copyright
infringement claims are not surprising.
To reduce the risks of infringement, the rights clearance of online music
streaming services could potentially be achieved through a system of ’extended
collective licensing’ (ECL). The ECL system was first developed in Scandinavia
in the 1960s and has since then become an important copyright licensing
mechanism in the Nordic countries. Over time ECLs have been put in place in
these countries and elsewhere in Europe to enable the lawful use of copyright
protected works for educational purposes, private copying purposes, library uses,
etc. Recently the European Union adopted the ECL model for the licensing of
certain uses of copyright protected works by cultural heritage institutions.5
Under this model, the effects of a freely negotiated collective licensing agreement
between a collective rights management organization (CMO) and a user
pertaining to a specific form of exploitation of works is extended by law to
non-members of the CMO. The agreement which is given the ’extended’ effect is
referred to as an ECL-agreement. Once an ECL agreement has been concluded,
the licensee may use the works covered by the agreement and does not run the
risk of getting a claim, either legal or financial, from a non-represented right
1 IFPI, ’Engagement with streaming drives growth of global music market’, see: https://
www.ifpi.org/our-industry/industry-data/.
2 For a list of legal services available in Canada, see: <https://musiccanada.com/digital-
music/>.
3 Heritiana Ravaison, Maria Iglesias, and Anna Vondraceck, ‘‘The Costs Of Licensing
ForOnlineMusic Services:AnExploratoryAnalysis ForEuropeanServices”(2013) 21:3
Michigan State International Law Review 666 at 671.
4 Ruth Towse, ‘‘Dealing withDigital: Economic Organisation of StreamedMusic” (2020)
Centre for Intellectual Property Policy and Management of Bournemouth University.
5 Directive 2019/790/EU on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, OJ L 130, 17.5.2019,
92 at 115 [Directive 2019/790].
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holder, otherwise referred to as ’non-member’. A licensee who enters into an
ECL agreement with a representative organization is thus assured that the
organization will meet all claims from those affected by the extension.6 The
establishment of an ECL system was recently discussed in favourable terms in
Canada, inside two government reports published at the close of the public
consultation on the Statutory Review of the Copyright Act.7
Even if it is widespread in the Nordic countries and beyond, this licensing
model has never been used in relation to the licensing of online, interactive, music
streaming services. If the ECL system has so many advantages, why has it not
been put in place anywhere for this purpose? The question that this article aims
to answer is whether the ECL model can offer a feasible solution to the problem
of rights clearance for online music streaming services in Canada. An ECL
mechanism will be deemed feasible for the licensing of online music streaming
services, if all the necessary and sufficient conditions of such a system can be met.
Among necessary conditions, probably the most important is the requirement
that the CMO(s) be representative of a ’substantial’ number of rights owners in
the category of rights that it usually administers. The right of non-members to
receive individual remuneration for the use of their work and to opt-out from the
ECL arrangement are two additional essential conditions for a valid ECL
system.8 The main obstacle to the use of ECLs in the context of online music
streaming services most likely does not lie on the side of the online music
streaming services. As long as the relevant CMO(s) hold(s) the necessary rights,
there is in principle no impediment to the negotiation of an agreement with an
online streaming service. The problem probably lies on the side of the rights
owners, more specifically with respect to the representativeness of CMOs. The
complexity of the music industry plays a key role in the capacity of CMOs to
acquire all the rights necessary to negotiate and grant licenses that can
legitimately be extended to non-members of the CMO.
The article is further divided into four parts. Section 2 describes the legal
framework underlying the online music streaming services in the European
Union, the United States, and Canada, where we examine the current licensing
practices for online streaming services in the same three jurisdictions. Section 3
describes what are ECLs, first giving an overview of the main characteristics of
the ECL model and second, discussing how certain countries have implemented
6 Johan Axhamn, and Lucie Guibault, ‘‘Cross-border extended collective licensing: a
solution to online dissemination of Europe’s cultural heritage?” (2011) Amsterdam:
Institute for Information Law at 4 [Axhamn and Guibault]. Research carried out for
EuropeanaConnect.
7 House of Commons of Canada, Standing Committee on Industry, Science and
Technology, ‘‘StatutoryReview of theCopyrightAct”, (3 June 2019), recommendations
21 and 36; House of Commons of Canada, Standing Committee Canadian Heritage,
Shifting Paradigms, (19 May 2019), recommendation 19.
8 Thomas Riis, ‘‘Extended Collective Licensing from an Economic Perspective”, in J.
Blomquist (ed.), Copyright, To Be or Not to Be, Ex Tuto Publishing (2019) at 256 [Riis].
EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSING 215
ECLs in practice. Section 4 discusses the challenges posed to Canadian CMOs in
meeting the requirements of a legitimate ECL model. The most salient challenge
concerns the requirement of representativeness of an ECL granting CMO, but
section 4 also examines the safeguards that must be implemented to protect the
interests of non-members, the role that the Copyright Board of Canada could be
asked to play in the implementation of an ECL regime, and the compliance of
ECLs with international obligations in the area of copyright law. Section 5 draws
conclusions on the feasibility of using an ECL model for the licensing of online
streaming of musical works.
2. LICENSING PRACTICES FOR ONLINE MUSIC STREAMING
SERVICES
Online streaming services aim to offer the most comprehensive, worldwide
repertoire to their subscribers. In order to achieve this, they must be able to clear
the rights from whichever entity holds these rights. While most musical works are
likely to have similar rights holders (an author, a performer, a record producer,
and a music publisher), the exclusive rights conferred by law to each of them and
the ensuing licensing practice differs per country. For an online music streaming
service to take place, musical worsk must first be copied on a server before they
can be accessed by the public. In all jurisdictions, these acts affect two categories
of rights holders: the authors, who enjoy copyright protection on their original
musical composition or lyrics; and the performing artist and the sound recording
company, who benefit from related rights with respect to the fixation of the
performance of the work on a commercial recording.9
From a copyright perspective, the online streaming of musical works
involves two generic rights: the right of reproduction and the right of
communication to the public.10 This latter right, also known as ’making
available right’, encompasses the interactive communication of the work to the
public from a place and at a time individually chosen by the member of the
public.11 The reproduction right is also known as the mechanical reproduction
right; it covers the right to mechanically reproduce the work on any format,
including digitally. From a related rights perspective, the online streaming
engages the right of making the sound recording available to the public. These
9 Note that this section is strongly inspired from Europe Economics, Lucie Guibault, Stef
vanGompel, andOlivia. Salamanca,Study on the remuneration of authors and performers
for the use of their works and fixations of performances (final report) [Europe Economics].
Study prepared for the European Commission, DG Internal Market, MARKT/2013/
080/D, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015, at 258. ISBN
978-92-79-47162-9/ DOI:10.2759/834167.
10 Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, C. 42, ss. 3, 15 and 18 [Copyright Act]; Directive
2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of copyright and related rights in the information
society, OJ L 167, 22.6.2001, at 10, art. 2 and 3; US Copyright Act, USCTitle 17, S. 106.
11 Copyright Act, supra note 10 s. 2(4)(1.1); Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of
copyright and related rights in the information society, art. 3(2).
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rights are all transferable, but licensing practices differ widely between countries.
Digital providers need to ensure that they clear all rights in an appropriate
manner which will depend on both the territorial distribution of the work and the
origin of the repertoire. This section first describes the law and licensing practices
relating to copyright in the musical works, before turning to the law and licensing
practices relating to the related rights in the sound recordings in the European
Union, the United States, and Canada.
At the outset, it is important to point out that the fragmentation of rights
and the geographical division of markets have given rise to an almost inextricable
web of contractual relations between rights owners themselves and with CMOs.
To complicate matters further, it is not uncommon to see some of the big players
cumulate different roles in the music industry, e.g. acting as music publisher and
recording company, whereby they also cumulate rights. In the absence of any
existing comprehensive overview, the result is a highly opaque market where it is
extremely difficult, as an outsider, to ascertain the ’who is who’, ’who owns
what’, and ’who does what’ in relation to the licensing of rights for online
interactive uses. The explanation below is given to the best of my knowledge, on
the basis of extensive cross-checking of publicly available information.
(a) Licensing of Copyright for Online Music Streaming Services
As mentioned above, online music streaming services must obtain a license
on the mechanical right and the making available right of the author and his/her
assignee, in order to offer a lawful service. In the best case, a license will be
available from a CMO. In the music sector, membership in a copyright CMO is
purely voluntary. Both authors (composers and lyricists) and publishers may
become members of a CMO. A proportion of them chooses not to join a CMO.
However, depending on the jurisdiction concerned, the mechanical and making
available rights may be exercised either through a CMO, individually or through
a for-profit organisation that carries on the business of licensing of rights,
otherwise known in Europe as an ’independent management entity’.
i. European Union
The regulation of licensing practices around online music services has
changed dramatically in Europe since the adoption of Directive 2014/26/EU on
collective rights management.12 Title III of this Directive sets out a legal
framework promoting the development of multi-territory and multi-repertoire
licensing by CMOs in the field of musical works. Pursuant to the provisions in
the Directive, CMOs have the choice whether to carry out the multi-territorial
licensing of their repertoire themselves or to entrust other CMOs with it.13
12 Directive 2014/26/EC of 26 February 2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial
licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market, 2014/26/EC
O.J. L 84/72, 20.03.2014.
13 Directive 2014/26/EU on collective rights management, art. 29 and 30.
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Directive 2014/26/EU further sets out functional, technical and operational
requirements and additional standards of good governance with which CMOs
granting multi-territorial licenses for online rights in musical works must comply.
The two definitions contained in article 3 of Directive 2014/26/EU of
collective management organisation (CMO) and independent management entity
(IME) are worth reproducing in full:
(a) ‘collective management organisation’ means any organisation which is
authorised by law or by way of assignment, licence or any other contractual
arrangement to manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of
more than one rightholder, for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its
sole or main purpose, and which fulfils one or both of the following criteria:
(i) it is owned or controlled by its members;
(ii) it is organised on a not-for-profit basis;
(b) ‘independent management entity’ means any organisation which is
authorised by law or by way of assignment, licence or any other contractual
arrangement to manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of
more than one rightholder, for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its
sole or main purpose, and which is:
(i) neither owned nor controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by
rightholders; and
(ii) organised on a for-profit basis.
For decades the right of mechanical reproduction and the right of
communication to the public were licensed for analogue uses through one, or
two closely related, CMOs in each territory of the member states of the European
Union. Examples of CMOs that manage both categories of rights on behalf of
their members are SABAM (Belgium), SGAE (Spain), SIAE (Italy). Examples of
such closely cooperating CMOs are KODA (performing rights) and NCB
(mechanical rights) in Denmark; Buma (performing rights) and Stemra
(mechanical rights) in the Netherlands; and PRS for Music is the home of the
Performing Right Society (PRS) and the Mechanical-Copyright Protection
Society (MCPS) in the UK. All these CMOs in principle represent the rights of
authors and publishers.
The long-standing practice of CMOs holds that the payments made by the
CMOs to the individual authors and their publisher are dependent on the
contractual terms binding both of these parties. Most often, where a writer has
assigned their rights to a publisher, these rights are governed by the terms of
both:
. the writer’s publishing agreement
. the writer’s and/or publisher’s arrangements with collecting societies.
CMO members who are published typically assign 100% of the mechanical
rights and the right to receive 50% of income from the performing rights to their
publisher, whilst the remaining 50% is distributed to the writer through the
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CMO. In other words, if an author has signed a music publishing deal, they
receive no royalties for the mechanical rights and 50% of the royalties for the
public performance of their work. The publisher’s mechanical rights may be
exercised through a CMO or individually, while the author’s performance right is
virtually always exercised through a CMO.
The European copyright licensing landscape has increased in complexity in
the past decade, especially as it relates to the licensing of online music services.
Traditional CMOs are still active but the market has exploded. Not only have
some CMOs reorganised their reciprocal arrangements with a view to granting
multi-territorial licenses more easily; but some rights owners have withdrawn
their repertoire from small CMOs to concentrate them with a consortium of big
CMOs. Moreover, new players, known as independent management entities,
have emerged on the market.
A first change was marked by the introduction through Directive 2014/26/
EU of the ‘passport’ regime,14 which enables any CMO that is not willing or not
able to grant multi-territorial licenses directly in its own music repertoire to
request another CMO to represent its repertoire on a multi-territorial basis. This
legal regime has been introduced to reduce the number of licenses that an online
music provider needs to operate a multi-territory/multi-repertoire music service.
By facilitating the voluntary aggregation of music repertoire and rights that
online music providers require, the passport system aims to foster the
development of new online services and reduce the transaction costs that
ultimately may be passed on to consumers.15 The passport construction consists
in one CMO granting a non-exclusive mandate of representation to another
CMO that is indeed capable of fulfilling the criteria for CMOs offering multi-
territorial licenses.16 This non-exclusive mandate should ensure that CMOs can
join different hubs for the multi-territorial licensing of their repertoire and that
users seeking multi-territorial licenses have the choice to obtain licenses from
several licensing hubs.17 Any CMO that has mandated another CMO to grant
multi-territorial licenses is explicitly allowed to continue to grant licenses in its
own music repertoire and in any other music repertoire which it is authorised to
represent in its own territory.18
The most visible outcome of the Directive’s passport option is the creation of
ICE (International Copyright Enterprise), a joint venture between PRS for
Music, STIM, and GEMA with the collective aim of developing the world’s first
integrated music copyright, licensing, and processing hub, encouraging copyright
14 Directive 2014/26/EC, art. 29-31; See J.P. Quintais, ‘Proposal for a Directive on
collective rights management and (some) multi-territorial licensing’(2013) European
Intellectual Property Review 35, no. 2, 65 at 70.
15 Ibid, Recital 44.
16 Ibid, Art. 29(1).
17 Ibid, Recital 44.
18 Ibid, Recital 46.
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data accuracy, aggregation of repertoires for multi-territory licences, and the
elimination of parallel processing against incompatible works databases. In 2016,
Buma/Stemra reported to have been the first European CMO to sign an
agreement with ICE, an initiative of the collecting societies from Sweden and the
UK to jointly manage data. This construction enables Buma/Stemra to obtain a
position in a competing market that will contribute to an optimal collection,
accurate distribution of revenues and a very efficient cost structure due to
economies of scale.19 The Irish Music Rights Organisation (IMRO) became a
direct customer of ICE’s Core Licence in June 2019. Under the terms of the new
agreement, ICE will provide a full suite of licensing and administration services
for online usage. ICE also represents the rights of Sabam and Polaris Nordic
(Koda, Teosto, TONO).20 The ICE licence includes the mechanical and
performing rights in the ICE Core repertoire.21 The ICE Core repertoire is the
repertoire ICE licenses directly on a multi-territory basis, as an agent for several
rightsholders. In general, this includes the repertoire of PRS, GEMA, STIM,
IMRO, MCPS, independent publishers that have joined up with PRS’ multi-
territory initiative, as well as additional publishers directly affiliated with ICE
(Peer, Downtown and Concord). Authors published by independent music
publishers (IMPEL) are also represented through the intermediary of ICE. Note
that the multi-territorial licenses granted by ICE cover the European Economic
Area (EEA) and additional territories.
A second important change in the European collective management market
is that major American music publishers have withdrawn their repertoire from
the administration of most European CMOs. These major publishers decided to
either concentrate their rights in the hands of a small number of big CMOs or to
exercise their rights individually. A prime example of an organization that
concentrates rights in one hand is SOLAR Music Rights Management,22 which
administers the combined Anglo-American catalogues of Sony/ATV and EMI
Music Publishing for online and mobile licensing across the EU and other
regions. SOLAR is a jointly-owned subsidiary of PRS for Music and GEMA and
the administration of the licences is carried out in partnership with ICE.23
19 Buma/Stemra, ‘‘Annual Report 2016” (2017), online: BumaStemra <https://www.bu-
mastemra.nl/en/bumastemra-distributes-over-147-million-euros/>; this follows also
from a legal dispute opposing Buma and PRS: Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, decision
of 19 January 2010 (Buma v PRS), ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BL4289; affirms District
Court of Haarlem, decision of 19 August 2008, (PRS v Buma), ECLI:NL:RB-
HAA:2008:BE8765.
20 Ice Services, ‘‘Copyright”, online: Ice Services<https://www.iceservices.com/services/
copyright/>.
21 Ice Services ‘‘Frequently Asked Questions”, online: Ice Services <https://www.iceser-
vices.com/licensr/faq/>.
22 SOLARMusic, ‘‘Privacy”, online: SOLARMusic Rights Management Ltd .
23 PRS for Music, ‘‘Sony/ATV and SOLAR extend Pan-European Digital Licence
Administration Agreement” (30 October 2018), online: PRS for Music <https://
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The figure below illustrates how authors and publishers would license their
rights through SOLAR and ICE for Spotify’s European market. We see that
authors generally license their performing right to the national CMO - or any
CMO of their choice, while the mechanical right is first transferred to the
publisher who then licenses the right to SOLAR & ICE for further licensing to
services like Spotify.
Similarly to Sony/ATV who established SOLARMusic Rights Management,
Warner/Chappell operates via its PEDL (Pan European Digital Licensing)
initiative which in practice means they may choose a different administrator for
each licence and thereby rights may flow differently under individual licensing
deals. In most instances, the performing rights are administered by ICE regardless
of the PEDL partner chosen by Warner/Chappell. With respect to the mechanical
rights, however, Warner/Chappell has opted to bring its repertoire under the
administration of the French SACEM, rather than ICE.24 By contrast, Universal
Music Publishing25 has signed a representation agreement with SACEM for the
administration of the online rights, which covers both Universal’s performing
rights and mechanical rights. BMG, or the Bertelsman Group, has also created
its own initiative called ARESA (Anglo-American Rights European Service
Agency), and ICE represents the performing right and mechanical rights in the
Anglo-American repertoire of BMG for online and mobile distribution within
the European Economic Area (EEA) and additional territories.
www.prsformusic.com/press/2018/sonyatv-solar-extend-pan-european-digital-licence-
administration-agreement>.
24 PRS for Music, ‘‘Who Administers my Online Royalties?”, online: PRS for Music
<https://www.prsformusic.com/royalties/online-royalties/online-royalty-administra-
tion> [Online Royalties].
25 Universal Music Publishing Group, ‘‘License Quote Request”, online: Universal Music
Publishing Group<https://www.umusicpub.com/us/license-request>.
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A summary of the different relations is provided in Table 1 below.







Sony/ATV SOLAR ICE SOLAR/ ICE
Warner/Chappell PEDL SACEM varying
Universal SACEM SACEM
BMG ARESA ICE ICE
Independent IMPEL ICE ICE or SACEM (for
Spotify and iTunes)
Kobalt AMRA ICE AMRA
A third, observable change in the European rights management landscape is
the appearance of new independent management entities on the market. Among
them are AMRA Music27, Songtrust28, Songs, Kobalt, Olé, Royalty Exchange,
Audiam, TuneRegistry, Rumblefish, Syntax Creative, and Sentric music. These
entities describe themselves in different ways, sometimes as publishers, others as
royalty collection services, others as digital registries. Those organizations acting
as publishers pursue a broad mission of encouraging the creation, production,
management, and distribution of music. Part of this mission is to collect royalties
from leading streaming services like Spotify, Apple Music, Pandora,
SoundCloud, and YouTube/Google Music. Typically, creators retain the rights
to their songs; therefore, these entities act as intermediaries between the author
or publisher they represent and the online platform where the music is exploited.
If the rights owners have registered their performing rights with a CMO, these
entities will collect the moneys from those CMOs on behalf of their clients. Other
arrangements may exist with respect to the mechanical rights, which may involve
direct licensing to the platforms.29 For example, Kobalt has signed a deal with
ICE to collect the performing rights. Administration of the mechanical rights is
undertaken by AMRA on behalf of Kobalt.
ii. United States
While the collective management of rights has been the object of antitrust
control by the Department of Justice for decades30, CMOs are not as such
regulated under the US Copyright Act other than being mentioned in a definition
26 Online Royalties, supra note 24.
27 AMRA, ‘‘ARMA Homepage”, online: AMRA<https://www.amra.com/> [AMRA].
28 Songtrust, ‘‘Songtrust Homepage”, online: Songtrust<https://www.songtrust.com/>.
29 See for example: AMRA, supra note 27.
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in section 101. Traditionally, performance rights are administered in the United
States by the three long established PROs (performance rights organizations),
e.g. ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC; mechanical rights are licensed either by
agreement with HFA (Harry Fox Agency), other selected agents, or directly by
music publishers. On-demand platforms require performance and mechanical
licenses from both the composer and sound recording copyright owners; they
must therefore negotiate licensing deals with the major music publishers, record
labels, and the three PROs.31 If any artist or song is not covered by any of these
deals, a platform that makes it available for streaming will be liable for
infringement. While the licensing practice of the three PROs has remained
relatively unaffected, the last five years have seen important changes take place in
the area of mechanical rights management. The licensing of the rights on sound
recordings is discussed in the following section.
First, HFA acquired SESAC in 2015, and launched Mint Digital Services, in
2017, a joint venture between SESAC and Swiss collection society, SUISA. It
was the first transatlantic collaboration between organizations that represent
musical works on behalf of publishers and songwriters and is the only company
to span both U.S. and European copyright laws. Today, Mint is providing
services to major publishers such as Warner Chappell and BMG, along with a
number of independent publishers through the HFA Affiliate Program. With
HFA being the main mechanical rights agency in the United States, if Universal
Music Publishing and Sony/ATV are not listed among their clients, this means
that they presumably license their mechanical rights individually to the online
music streaming services operating on the American territory. As part of Mint
Digital Services, SESAC offers to license the performance rights and mechanical
rights on the works in its repertoire, as well as the performing rights of a few
collecting societies, on a multi-territorial basis, to digital service providers.32
Second, the American copyright music licensing market saw first the
emergence of independent management agencies or third-party distributors,
before they blew over to Europe. The most prominent are Kobalt Music and
Rightsflow (Google), but there are many others. These entities vary in size,
shape, and purpose, similar to those described in the previous section. Kobalt
offers royalty collection services as well as publishing and recording services. It
licenses mechanical and performance rights to digital streaming providers on the
US territory, but has representation agreements with ICE, the PRS, and other
European CMOs. CD Baby explains on its website that it collects the publisher’s
share of performance and mechanical royalties for compositions on behalf of
30 Michelle E.Arnold, ‘‘AMatter of (Anti) Trust: TheHarryFoxAgency, the Performance
Rights Societies, and Antitrust Litigation” (2008) 81:4 Temp. L. Rev. 1169.
31 Daniel S. Hess, ‘‘Thewaiting is the hardest part: theMusicModernizationAct’s attempt
to fix music licensing” (2019) U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 187 at 194 [Hess].
32 Mint Digital Services, “Who We Are”, online: Mint Digital Services <https://
www.suisa.ch/en/suisa/mint/mint-digital-services.html>.
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songwriters. They collect these from the US and abroad via Performing Rights
Organizations and other collection agencies.
Third and most importantly, Congress adopted theMusic Modernization Act
(MMA) on October 11, 2018.33 The Act creates a compulsory licensing regime
for mechanical rights administered through a newly established Mechanical
Licensing Collective Inc. (MLC). MLC’s purpose is to allow interactive
streaming platforms to be granted blanket mechanical licenses so that they no
longer have to negotiate with each individual songwriter/publisher.34 Before the
enactment of the MMA, streaming services, like Apple, Amazon, Spotify, and
Google must seek to obtain a license directly from publishers, which was costly
and burdensome.35 The MLC serves as a one-stop-shop to license the mechanical
rights from the HFA repertoire and all self-administered songwriters and music
publishers that register with it. A key provision introduced in the MMA is the
immunity provision at section § 115 (d)(10)(A), which guards online streaming
services from copyright infringement liability for any failure to obtain a license
after the date of January 1, 2018.
The Copyright Alliance summarizes the role of the MLC in these words:
The MLC will (i) collect, distribute, and audit the royalties generated
from these licenses to and for the respective musical work owners; (ii)
create and maintain a public database that identifies musical works
with their owners along with ownership share information; (iii) provide
information to help with and engage in matching musical works with
their respective sound recordings; and (iv) hold unclaimed royalties for
at least 3 years before distributing them on a market-share basis to
copyright owners as reflected by royalty payments made by digital
music providers for the covered activities in question. The MLC will be
funded by administrative assessment fees paid out by blanket licensees
and by ‘‘significant nonblanket licensees“.36
It is our understanding that online music streaming services still obtain a
license on the performance rights from the PROs.
iii. Canada
Pursuant to section 2 of the Canadian Copyright Act, CMOs are defined as:
“. . .a society, association or corporation that carries on the business of
collective administration of copyright or of the remuneration right conferred by
section 19 or 81 for the benefit of those who, by assignment, grant of licence,
33 OrrinG.Hatch-BobGoodlatteMusicModernizationAct, Public LawNo 115-264, Oct.
11, 2018.
34 17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (2018). [U.S.C.]
35 Hess, supra note 31 at 197.
36 Copyright Alliance, ‘‘Summary of H.R. 1551, the Music Modernization Act (MMA)”,
online: Copyright Alliance <https://copyrightalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/
10/CA-MMA-2018-senate-summary_CLEAN.pdf>.
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appointment of it as their agent or otherwise, authorize it to act on their behalf in
relation to that collective administration, and
(a) operates a licensing scheme, applicable in relation to a repertoire of works,
performer’s performances, sound recordings or communication signals of
more than one author, performer, sound recording maker or broadcaster,
pursuant to which the society, association or corporation sets out classes
of uses that it agrees to authorize under this Act, and the royalties and
terms and conditions on which it agrees to authorize those classes of uses,
or
(b) carries on the business of collecting and distributing royalties or levies
payable under this Act in relation to a repertoire of works, performer’s
performances, sound recordings or communication signals of more than
one author, performer, sound recording maker or broadcaster;“
Collective societies are further regulated under the Copyright Act only in
relation to the approval of their tariffs by the Copyright Board.
SOCAN (Society of Composers, Authors, and Music Publishers of Canada)
was established in 1990 by the merging of two former Canadian performing
rights societies: CAPAC (Composers, Authors and Publishers Association of
Canada Limited), founded in 1925 as CPRS-Canadian Performing Rights
Society; and PROCAN (Performing Rights Organization of Canada Limited),
founded in 1940 as BMI Canada Limited. SOCAN administers performing rights
on behalf of its members — Canadian composers, songwriters, lyricists, and their
publishers.
Until 2018, the mechanical reproduction right was administered either via the
CMRRA (Canadian Musical Reproduction Rights Agency), or SODRAC
(Society for Reproduction Rights of Authors, Composers & Publishers in
Canada). In 2018, SOCAN acquired SODRAC, and added mechanical rights
administration to its collection and distribution services. Today, rights owners
can choose to assign both the performing and mechanical rights to SOCAN, or
they can still choose to assign their mechanical right to the CMRRA. SODRAC
signed an agreement with Music Canada, which is a non-profit trade
organization founded in 1964 that promotes the interests of its members as
well as their partners, the artists. Music Canada’s members are Sony Music
Entertainment Canada Inc., Universal Music Canada Inc., and Warner Music
Canada Co.37 SODRAC also has direct agreements with individuals.
CMRRA-SODRAC Inc. (CSI) is a joint venture of the Canadian Musical
Reproduction Rights Agency Ltd. (CMRRA) and the Society for Reproduction
Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers in Canada (SODRAC). Together,
CMRRA and SODRAC represent the vast majority of songwriters and music
publishers whose songs are used in the Canadian marketplace. CSI was
incorporated in 2002, initially as a vehicle to collect the royalties derived from
CMRRA and SODRAC’s distinct Commercial Radio Tariffs. Since then, CSI
37 Music Canada, ‘‘About”, online:Music Canada<https://musiccanada.com/about/>.
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has applied for a series of other tariffs certified by the Copyright Board of
Canada, including the Online Music Services Tariff and the Multi-Channel
Subscription Radio Services Tariff.
CSI’s role is to provide a convenient one-stop licensing shop to access a
worldwide music repertoire for use in Canada. CSI licenses its repertoire by way
of tariffs certified by the Copyright Board of Canada or by way of privately
negotiated agreements. Prior to 2019 CSI licensed the reproduction rights in the
joint repertoire of CMRRA and SODRAC to various music users, including
radio stations, background music services, and online music services.38
According to CSI’s website, CSI issues licenses for the reproduction right to
online music services making available musical content represented by CSI in
Canada. CSI administers the Online Music Service Tariff certified by the
Canadian Copyright Board and, to be duly licensed, online music services
wishing to operate in Canada must report content and sales activity to CSI in
accordance to the Tariff’s provisions.
Under the current tariff, an Online Music Service is defined as a service that
delivers streams or limited downloads to subscribers or permanent downloads to
consumers, other than a service that offers only streams in which the file is selected
by the service, which can only be listened to at a time chosen by the service and for
which no advanced play list is published’ (emphasis added). Indeed, the currently
applicable Certified CMRRA/SODRAC Online Music Services Tariff includes
limited and permanent download services, interactive webcast services, hybrid
webcast services, non-interactive webcast services, and online music services
(defined as including all previously mentioned services).39 This Tariff does not
seem to cover online, interactive, music streaming services like those offered by
Spotify, Deezer, and others.
This is summarized in Table 2 below.
Table 2 - Role of CMOs in Canada
CMO Rights owner represented Rights managed










38 CSI Music Services, ‘‘Welcome to CSI Music Services”, online: CSI Music Services
<http://www.cmrrasodrac.ca/en/welcome-bienvenue/>.
39 Copyright Board of Canada, ‘‘Statement of Royalties to be Collected for the
Communication to the Public by Telecommunication or the Reproduction, in Canada,
of Musical Works”, Online Music Services (CSI: 2011-2013; SOCAN: 2011-2013;
SODRAC: 2011-2013), Erratum - Supplement to the Canada Gazette, vol. 151, No. 42,
October 21, 2017.
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As it is the case in the European Union and the USA, the Canadian
copyright music licensing market has witnessed the emergence of independent
management agencies that offer various services to self-administered or
unpublished authors, including licensing services. An unknown number of the
previously described entities are active globally, including on the Canadian
market. Kobalt, for example, is also active on the Canadian market. It is unclear
from how many entities besides SOCAN and CMRRA, online streaming services
would need to secure licenses to cover the entire repertoire that they wish to
exploit. However, it is our impression that CSI’s combined repertoire, which
includes the Canadian daughter companies of the three major music publishers
(Sony Music Entertainment Canada Inc., Universal Music Canada Inc., and
Warner Music Canada Co.) and a number of smaller Canadian music publishers,
is likely to cover the vast majority of Canadian works that could be offered
through online streaming services. Whether CSI’s repertoire would cover foreign
works, so as to meet the online streaming services’ ambition of offering a global
repertoire, depends on CSI’s arrangements with sister organizations abroad.
(b) Licensing of Related Rights for Online Music Streaming Services
As in the case of copyrights, the online streaming of music involves both the
right of mechanical reproduction and the right of making available to the public,
if and where these rights are granted by law to the performer and the record
producer. The related rights of performing artists and record producers can be
exercised either collectively through a CMO, or individually. In the latter case,
the record producer usually has obtained the rights from the performing artists
so as to be the one entitled to grant licences to online music streaming services.
The result is that the exercise of related rights is also highly fragmented, as
explained below.
i. European Union
In Europe, both performing artists and record producers enjoy an exclusive
right of reproduction and communication to the public, including the right of
making available in a place and at a time individually chosen by the members of
the public, pursuant to articles 2 and 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC.40 These are the
rights involved in online streaming, and for which an online service provider
would need to obtain a licence from the rights owner. As will be further
explained below, the licensing of these rights is less straightforward than for
copyrights, first because the CMOs who normally represent performing artists do
not administer the online interactive rights, and second, because record
producers usually hold all rights on commercial music records.
Before the adoption of Directive 2001/29/EC in 2001, both categories of
rights owners were granted a right to equitable remuneration for the
40 Directive 2001/29/ECof the European Parliament and of theCouncil of 22May 2001 on
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information
society, OJ L167, 2001-06-22, at 10.
EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSING 227
communication to the public of commercial phonograms, pursuant to article 8(2)
of Directive 92/100/EC on rental right and lending right and on certain rights
related to copyright in the field of intellectual property.41 On the basis of this
statutory right to equitable remuneration, every time a commercial phonogram is
communicated to the public in a member state of the European Union, a fee
must be paid to the rights owner. Where they did not exist prior to the adoption
of Directive 92/100/EC, CMOs were established in each and every member state
to collect and distribute the equitable remuneration owed to the rights owners.
CMOs, like SPEDIDAM (France), SENA (The Netherlands), PPL (UK) and
GVL (Germany), fulfill this role. Over time and with the development of
technology, equitable remuneration has been perceived for acts of
communication to the public by wire or wireless means, including for diverse
online radio offerings, like webcasting. Since article 8(2) of Directive 92/100/EC
is not applicable to the making available of a fixation of a performance, no fee is
collected for any type of interactive, on-demand, acts of making available. As
these CMOs draw their mandate from a statutory provision, it would require a
legislative amendment to allow them to expand their activities to the collection of
royalties for interactive, on-demand, acts of making available.
As a result, the CMOs that collect the equitable remuneration flowing from
the communication to the public of commercial phonograms have no legal
mandate to act with respect to the right of making available on-demand. This
exclusive right in principle rests with the performer and the record producer.
However, by virtue of agreeing to the fixation of their performance in a
commercial phonogram, the performer’s making available right is automatically
transferred to the producer, along with the rights of fixation and physical
distribution of the sound recording. Apart from a single fixed fee for the transfer
of the latter rights, performers receive no specific remuneration in return for the
transfer of their rights for on demand uses of their recorded performances.42
If CMOs are not legally entitled to collect royalties on behalf of performing
artists for online streaming, then performing artists have one of three options at
their disposal: either they produce their own records and manage their own
rights, which may entail high transaction costs to get their music played on
streaming services like Apple, Amazon, Deezer, Google, or Spotify; or they leave
the exploitation of their rights to their record producer, the benefits of which
depend entirely on their bargaining position vis-à-vis the producer; or finally,
they entrust the administration of their online rights to one of the many
41 Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the
field of intellectual property (codified version) OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, 28—35 - codifying
Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right
and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, OJ L 346,
27.11.1992, at 61.
42 Europe Economics, supra note 9 at 77. Study prepared for the European Commission,
DG Internal Market, MARKT/2013/080/D, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the
European Union, 2015.
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distributors that have emerged to fill the gap on the European and worldwide
market.
Besides the three major record producers (Sony Music, Universal Music, and
Warner Music) that operate across Europe, each member state counts a varying
number of independent record labels whose mission is to promote local artists.43
Especially big and powerful record labels, like the three majors, tend to require a
full transfer of rights from the artists they sign up. Even smaller record labels will
expect the transfer of the mechanical and performance rights in their favour, so
that they can license them to the online streaming platforms themselves and
distribute royalties to performing artists according to the terms of their contract.
The level of remuneration paid to the artists varies of course in function of their
negotiating skills, but this is not essential for this article.
Performing artists can also elect to distribute their catalogue using a third-
party distributor. These companies handle the licensing, distribution and
administration of an artist’s music. Among these are Tunecore, DistroKid,
Record Union, CDBaby, Emubands, iGroove, and numerous others. Record
Union, for example, pursues the mission of enabling and supporting the full
potential of every music maker in the world by making the music industry more
democratic, accessible and transparent for the many. Record Union is a
distributor of performing artists’ audio recordings. The terms and conditions to
which artists must agree before uploading their recordings on the website state
that the rights granted in the Agreement include, but are not limited to, the sale
of recordings, permanent digital downloads, temporary digital downloads,
interactive streaming, non-interactive streaming, cloud services, and streaming-
on-demand services. The grant of rights does not constitute a transfer of
ownership of the recordings, as artists retain ownership of their related rights.44
ii. United States
Contrary to the law in force in the European Union and Canada, American
Federal Copyright law does not provide for a general right of equitable
remuneration of performers or recording producers when their recordings are
publicly performed,45 except for a limited digital public performance right for
sound recordings.46 This specific right was introduced in American law through
the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995.47 The right
43 For a non-exhaustive list of record labels present in different markets, see: https://
www.ifpi.org/our-members.php.
44 Record Union, ‘‘Terms and Conditions”, online: Record Union <https://www.recor-
dunion.com/terms-and-conditions.html>.
45 NRCC Statement of Royalties 1998-2002 (Tariff 1.A), Re, 1999 CarswellNat 3247, 3
C.P.R. (4th) 350, [1999] C.B.D. No. 3 (Copyright Bd.) at para 7.
46 Glynn S. Lunney, ‘‘Copyright Collectives and Collecting Societies: The United States
Experience”, in D. Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Rights, 3ed., Kluwer Law
International, 2016, 319-366 at 344 [Lunney].
47 104 Pub. L. No. 39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
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applies only to a limited category of non-subscription and subscription
transmissions, such as certain webcasters, or to interactive transmissions that
enable a member of the public to receive, on request, a transmission of a
particular sound recording or a programme specially created for the recipient.48
But as Lunney explains, with respect to the first category of acts, the digital
public performance right for sound recordings was further narrowed by
subjecting it to a compulsory license.49 SoundExchange is the CMO designated
by Congress to administer the digital performance royalties for the use of sound
recordings on non-interactive platforms. SoundExchange represents recording
artists and small, medium and large record companies. Recording artists and
sound recording owners must be registered with SoundExchange in order to
receive digital performance royalties for the use of their sound recordings on
non-interactive platforms like SiriusXM, Pandora, and iHeart Radio.
With respect to interactive transmissions, however, a CMO has yet to be
created to license the performing artists and record companies’ rights to online
streaming services. Whereas the Music Modernization Act created a blanket
license on the songwriters’ and publishers’ mechanical rights for interactive
streaming and digital downloads of musical works, it brought no change to the
licensing situation of performing artists and record companies. Interactive
services like Spotify, Apple, and all the others, are therefore left to negotiate
licences with each individual copyright owner.50 From the information available
on the internet, it would appear that the interactive digital performance royalties
are essentially left unlicensed. Even third-party distributors, like CD Baby, seem
to only collect the label portion of any unclaimed non-interactive digital
performance royalties for sound recordings from SoundExchange.51
The waters of the interactive streaming service licensing are particularly
murky for performing artists, but also for small record companies in the United
States. Those waters are presumably less so for the three major record labels,
Sony Music, Universal Music, and Warner Music. This is because the three
major record labels are also major music publishers, e.g. each record label is
closely associated with a corresponding music publisher. They hold all the
relevant rights in one hand and license them to online streaming services
accordingly. A singer-songwriter who signs a deal with one of the three majors
will receive from the company an annual sum that represents the author’s share
of remuneration for the entire bundle of rights, unless the author has assigned the
performance right to a PRO. A performing artist who only holds related rights
and no copyright will receive only the share of the royalties that represent the
online interactive performance of the fixation of the performance on the record.
48 U.S.C., supra note 43 § 114(d)(3).
49 See 37 C.F.R. § 262.4.
50 Lunney, supra note 46 at 345.
51 CD Baby, ‘‘What Types of Royalties do you Collect?” (July 2020), online: CD Baby
<https://support.cdbaby.com/hc/en-us/articles/203823219-What-types-of-royalties-
do-you-collect->.
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This depends of course on the terms of the record contract and the payment
structure of the online streaming service. Small record companies that hold no
copyright on the music they exploit will most likely encounter very high
transaction costs in their dealings with streaming services and they may do well
to appoint a third-party distributor to do so. However, if the licensing of related
rights in the United States is uncommon, they have an uphill battle there as well.
iii. Canada
Related rights were introduced in the Canadian legal system in 1997,52 when
the Copyright Act was amended to allow musicians, vocalists, and record
companies to collect royalties for the exploitation of their performances or sound
recordings. As it is the case in Europe, Canadian performing artists and makers
of sound recordings enjoy a right of equitable remuneration for the
communication to the public of performances fixed on sound recordings.
Re:Sound is the CMO that was created to collect and distribute the equitable
remuneration;53 it falls under the second prong of the definition of collecting
society in the Copyright Act, since it ’carries on the business of collecting and
distributing royalties or levies payable under this Act in relation to a repertoire of
works, performer’s performances, sound recordings’.54
The founding members of Re:Sound were the ACTRA Performers’ Rights
Society (ACTRA PRS, now ACTRA RACS), the American Federation of
Musicians (AFM, now MROC), La Société de gestion collective de l’Union des
artistes (Artisti), Audio-Video Licensing Agency (AVLA, now Connect Music
Licensing), and La société de gestion collective des droits des producteurs de
phonogrammes et de vidéogrammes du Québec (SOPROQ). Re:Sound
membership has since expanded to include Sony Music Entertainment Canada,
Warner Music Canada Co., and Universal Music Canada Inc.
Re:Sound collects remuneration for musicians and vocalists as well as for
sound recording makers under tariffs certified by the Copyright Board of
Canada. It then forwards the share of the royalties to MROC for distribution
among the musicians and vocalists that it represents and to CONNECT for
distribution among the record labels. Re:Sound currently licenses businesses
under tariffs for commercial radio, CBC radio, pay audio, background music,
satellite radio, live events, dance, and fitness activities. It licenses music streaming
services, but non-interactive and semi-interactive services only, which excludes
downloads and on-demand streaming.55
As in the case of the United States, it would seem that the related rights
owner’s interactive, online performance right is essentially left unlicensed in
52 S.C. 1997, c. 24.
53 M. Bouchard, ‘‘Collective Management in Canada”, (2016) in D. Gervais (ed.),
Collective Management of Rights, 3ed., Kluwer Law International, 265-287 at 269.
54 Copyright Act, supra note 10 s. 2.
55 Musician’s Rights Organization of Canada, ‘‘Royalties” online: Musician’s Rights
Organization of Canada<https://musiciansrights.ca/en/royalties/>.
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Canada. This means that, just like in the United States and unless they have
assigned the performance right to SOCAN, Canadian singer-songwriters will
receive their royalties from their publishers, payment which represents their share
of remuneration for the entire bundle of rights.
In conclusion, the licensing of the necessary rights for the legitimate offer of
online, interactive, music streaming services is highly fragmented and incomplete
in the three jurisdictions considered. As described in Table 3 below, CMOs play a
clear role for the management of the authors’ and publishers’ right of public
performance in all jurisdiction. CMOs play some role in the management of the
mechanical right of authors and publishers, but no role at all in the management
of related rights.




















































3. EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSING MECHANISMS
It appears from the above that in most jurisdictions, including Canada,
clearing rights for online, interactive, music streaming services involves multiple
rights owners and entities, which is extremely burdensome and inefficient. Rights
clearance counts as one of the major obstacles to the deployment of new services
in a territory. This explains why the idea of establishing a system of extended
collective licensing (ECL) was put forward as a possible solution for the
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clearance of online copyrights and related rights. This section explores whether
the ECL system would indeed be feasible in such a fragmented rights landscape
to cure the most salient transaction costs arising from rights clearance. To
answer this question, the first subsection describes the main characteristics of
ECLs. This leads to an examination of where, how, and to which end such
licensing mechanisms have been put in place in practice in three jurisdictions, the
Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.
(a) Main Characteristics of ECLs
Extended Collective Licensing (ECL) is a form of collective rights
management whereby the application of a freely negotiated copyright licensing
agreement between a user and a CMO, is extended by law to non-members of the
organisation. ECLs function in a two-tiered manner: first, the law recognises the
’extended’ application of agreements concluded between a CMO and a user to
non-members of the CMO; and second, the parties freely negotiate the content of
the agreement, including the level of remuneration. The ECL model differs from
the European statutory licence model in that, under the latter model, the rights
owner cannot oppose the use of the work as long as such use is done in
accordance with the conditions laid down in the law and provided that
remuneration is paid. The level of remuneration of a statutory license is usually
set by a government body or authority, rather than the parties themselves.56 The
ECL model also differs from the American compulsory license model in that,
under the latter, the conditions of use are laid down in the act rather than
negotiated. Only the level of remuneration is negotiated between the parties, or in
case no agreement can be reached, by the competent tribunal.
Apart from the need to implement a legislative provision that recognizes the
binding character of a freely negotiated agreement between a CMO and a user on
non-represented rights holders, ECLs are characterized by a number of key
features. Primarily to the benefit of the licensee, ECLs are meant to ensure that
all materials can be used without fear of meeting individual claims by outsiders
and criminal sanctions. The legislative provisions establishing the ECL
framework will often provide for a mediation mechanism, or other mode of
alternative dispute resolution, in case the negotiating parties cannot reach an
agreement. Since, in our opinion, the biggest challenge to the application of an
ECL mechanism to the licensing of online, interactive, music streaming services
rests on the relationship between creators and CMOs we focus in the pages below
on two key characteristics: first, the representativeness of the CMO, both in
terms of membership and mandate, and second, the safeguards in place for non-
members.57
56 Axhamn and Guibault, supra note 6 at 4.
57 Tarja Koskinen-Olsson and Vigdı́s Sigurdardottir, ‘‘Collective Management in the
Nordic Countries” (2016) D. Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Rights, 3ed.,
Kluwer Law International, 243 at 251 [Koskinen-Olsson and Sigurdardottir].
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i. Representativeness of CMO
Arguably, the most crucial requirement of the entire ECL system is that the
CMO that grants a licence to use the material be sufficiently representative of the
rights holders in their sector of operation.58 The representative character of the
CMO is a question of legitimacy towards the non-members and of legal certainty
towards the users: 1) a representative CMO will speak on behalf of a large
enough number of rights holders to legitimize the application of the agreement to
all rights owners, including non-members; 2) a representative CMO will be able
to grant a licence with broad coverage of the repertoire, which increases the legal
certainty for the users. A CMO with a low representation rate cannot pretend to
negotiate a legitimate agreement with users on behalf of all rights holders, nor
can it give any assurance to the user that the repertoire covered is sufficiently
important to reduce the risk of having a large number of non-members opt-out
of the agreement.59
The determination of what constitutes an acceptable level of
representativeness varies. The representative character of a CMO is generally
assessed in relation to the ’number of authors of a certain type of works which are
used in a country within the specified field’. Three factors play a role in the
assessment: 1) the number of authors, whose 2) works are covered by the license
and 3) whose rights are administered by the CMO. To be representative, an ECL
granting CMO needs to represent a sufficient number of authors or their
assignees, e.g. either publishers or heirs. What constitutes a sufficient number of
represented authors is not fixed and is generally determined on a case-by-case
basis by the government authority in charge of the supervision of CMOs. In the
Nordic countries’ experience, the number of authors must be ’substantial’, which
realistically is not 100%, but it should be somewhere between numerous and
considerable. A Norwegian court had determined that the representation of
approximately 50% of authors would be sufficient.60
The second aspect of a CMO’s representativeness consists in defining which
authors contribute to it. The answer depends on the breadth of the repertoire
licensed under the ECL. The broader the repertoire, the greater the required
representativeness. If the ECL license is meant to cover as many, or more, foreign
works than local works, then a national CMO will not be deemed representative
only on the basis of its national membership. Alen-Savikko and Knapstad
suggest that foreign rights holders are on the whole non-members.61 This is
58 Riis, supra note 8 at 256.
59 LucieGuibault and Simone Schroff, ‘‘Extended Collective Licensing for theUse of Out-
of-Commerce Works in Europe: A Matter of Legitimacy vis-à-vis Rights Holders”
(2018) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, IIC 49: 916
[Guibault and Schroff].
60 Decision of the Norwegian Kabeltvistnemda (The Cable Dispute Tribunal) of 28 June
2011, Case No. 1/2010 and case No. 4/2010 discussed in Riis (2019) at 259.
61 Anette Katariina Alen-Savikko, and Tone Scerresdotter Knapstad, ‘‘Extended collec-
tive licensing and online distribution - prospects for extending theNordic solution to the
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debatable. A CMO can be called upon to demonstrate its representativeness in
relation to the foreign repertoire as well. This will be achieved by establishing the
existence of reciprocal representation agreements between the national CMO and
the foreign sister CMOs.
The third aspect of the representativeness requirement concerns not the
number of rights owners represented, but the rights included in the mandate.
This criterion derives from the wording of the legislative provision enabling the
grant of an ECL, according to which the user obtains ’the right to exploit works
of the same nature’. This directly concerns the CMO’s mandate and its capacity
to grant licences with respect to the rights it administers. This aspect of the
representative character of the CMO must be neither overlooked or
underestimated, because it is at the core of the ECL system: to be entitled to
grant licences in the first place, whether on behalf of non-members or not, the
CMO must be entrusted by its members with an explicit mandate to represent
specific rights. The issue of the mandate of a CMO is as crucial for the good
functioning of an ECL scheme, as the number of authors represented.
ii. Safeguards for Non-Members
A key element of a legitimate ECL regime is the possibility for non-member
rights holders to withdraw from the scheme at will. In other words, a right holder
may veto the use of their work under the ECL agreement, e.g. to prohibit the said
use completely or an individual agreement with a user.62 Not all existing ECL
schemes in Scandinavia offer this option to rights owners. In particular cases,
such as broadcasting and cable retransmission, the legislator considered that it
would be unwise to give non-members a right of withdrawal as it would create
important holes in the repertoire of the CMO and hinder the operations of the
cable distributors.63 Nevertheless, together with the free negotiation of ECL
agreements between the CMO and the user(s), the opt-out option is nowadays
recognised as the element that makes the difference between a mandatory licence
and an ECL system. Without the possibility to withdraw from the regime, non-
members would lose control over the use of their works, meaning that they
would no longer be able to exercise their exclusive rights. An ECL system
without the possibility to opt-out would be akin to a mandatory licence.
To safeguard the authors’ interests, should they be dissatisfied with the
agreed level of remuneration or with the internal remuneration scheme of the
organization, they enjoy the right to claim individual remuneration for the
demonstrated exploitation of their work by the licensee. This right applies
regardless of any decision made by the licensee and is without prejudice to the
digital realm” (2019) In T. Pihlajarinne, J. Vesala, and O. Honkkila (Eds.), Online
Distribution of Content in the EU, Edward Elgar, 2019, 79 at 89 [Alen-Savikko and
Knapstad].
62 Riis, supra note 8 at 259.
63 Axhamn and Guibault, supra note 6 at 28.
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right of equal treatment vis-à-vis the members.64 In this sense, the non-member is
in a better position than the members of the CMO. However, in practice it can be
difficult for the non-member to prove the extent of use of their work(s) and there
is no obligation on the part of the user or the CMO to keep track of the use of
individual works.
Alen-Savikko and Knapstad add that to ensure that the right of withdrawal
and individual remuneration constitute legitimate and effective safeguards, non-
members should be made aware of them.65 ECL granting CMOs should
therefore take all measures necessary and reasonable to implement internal rules
of notification to bring the ECL regime to the attention of all authors covered by
the freely negotiated licence. This includes not only national members of the
CMO, but foreign authors as well, if they are covered by the licence.
(b) Foreign Experience with ECLs
ECL regimes have a long track record in all Nordic countries, e.g. Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, and Finland, but other countries increasingly see the appeal of
this type of licensing system. Focusing on the issue of CMO representativeness
and the safeguard for non-members, the following subsections give a brief
portrait of the experience with ECL in the Nordic countries, in the United
Kingdom, and at the European Union level.
i. Nordic Countries
The Nordic countries introduced the first ECL provision in their respective
national copyright acts at the beginning of the 1960s to solve the problem of
rights clearance in regard to the broadcasting of literary and musical works.66
Considering the vast number of works involved, it was deemed overly
burdensome to require from broadcasting organizations that they find and
sign a contract with every single author whose works were being used. The
administrative effort of finding non-members and negotiating a licence with them
were considered to give rise to considerable transaction costs. The primary
rationale behind the introduction of the ECL model was to reach a balance
between the respective interests of users and right holders. The ECL model was
considered to offer a middle ground between voluntary collective management
and compulsory licensing.67 From the initial use in the field of music
64 Although thewording of the statutory provisions differs slightly, this is the denotation of
section 51 second paragraph of the Danish Copyright Act; section 37 second paragraph
of the Norwegian Copyright Act; section 26 fifth paragraph of the Finnish Copyright
Act; and section 42a third paragraph of the Swedish Copyright Act.
65 Alen-Savikko and Knapstad, supra note 61 at 88.
66 The Nordic ECL model has been analysed mainly in the Nordic the legal literature, but
for English language contributions, see e.g. Koskinen-Olsso and Sigurdardottir, supra
note 57 at 253 ff.
67 Ibid.
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broadcasting, ECLs were expanded to cover various other types of uses,
including for private copying, educational uses, library uses, etc.
The main avenue followed in the Nordic countries to implement ECLs in the
various sectors has been to identify specific areas of use for which the extended
collective license confers to the user the right to exploit works of the kind referred
to in the agreement, despite the fact that the authors of those works are not
represented by the organization. Sweden and Denmark have more recently
broadened the possibility of adopting ECLs, by enacting a ’General ECL’
provision that allows the parties to define the area of application of an ECL
agreement. The Swedish generic provision states for example that ‘‘[e]xtended
collective license may also be invoked by users who, within a specified field, have
made an agreement on the exploitation of works with an organization
comprising a substantial number of authors of a certain type of works which
are used in [the country] within the specified field”.68 The Swedish and Danish
general ECL provisions have been used sparingly since their adoption and in very
specific areas.
Representativeness of CMOs is an important aspect of ECL regimes in
Scandinavia, where the CMOs must represent a ‘‘significant” (Sweden)69 or
‘‘substantial part of the authors” (Norway) or even ‘‘numerous authors”
(Finland)70, ‘‘of a certain type of works which are used in [the country] within the
specified field”.71 The law does not further specify what ‘‘substantial number”
means in practice. The degree of representativeness is going to vary by sector and
country. Existing schemes assess the representativeness in terms of membership
always in combination with the second criterion: mandate. For example, the
Danish Ministry of Culture assesses the representativeness of the CMO as a
combination of membership size and the specific use (exclusive right) in question.
In other words, while the absolute size of the membership matters, it can only be
understood in respect to the specific right in question.72 In this context, the
CMO’s statutes and therefore membership contracts form part of this
examination.
The safeguards to the non-members have not always been guaranteed across
the board of the several ECL regimes in place in the Nordic countries. For
certain types of uses, like secondary broadcasting of musical works, there was
fear that allowing rights owners to withdraw would create a hold up on the
broadcast repertoire, which would defy the purpose of the whole endeavour.73
68 Swedish Copyright Act 2014, art. 42(h).
69 Ibid art. 42a.
70 Article 26 of the Finnish Copyright Act requires that the organisation ‘represents, in a
given field, numerous authors of works used in Finland’.
71 Tryggvadottir ‘Digital Libraries, the Nordic system of extended collective licensing and
cross-border use’ (2014/15) Auteurs & Media at 318.
72 Guibault and Schroff, supra note 59 at 930.
73 Riis, supra note 8 at 259.
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Nevertheless the two safeguards for non-members, e.g. the right to withdraw and
the right to receive individual remuneration, have emerged as basic pillars of the
ECL system.
ii. United Kingdom
The advantages of the ECL regime for the clearance of rights in sectors
where transaction costs are too high to ensure effective licensing have not gone
unnoticed to other countries in Europe. The United Kingdom adopted an ECL
provision in the Enterprise and Regulatory Act 2013,74 which was completed by
the Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended Collective Licensing)
Regulations 2014.75 The Regulations establish a system of government approval
of ECL licences. The Secretary of State may, if he considers it reasonable in the
circumstances to do so, authorise a relevant licensing body to operate an ECL
Scheme after receiving an application made in accordance with the Regulations.
The Secretary of State may only grant an authorization if he is satisfied that the
relevant licensing body’s representation in the type of relevant works which are
to be the subject of the proposed Extended Collective Licensing Scheme is
significant. ’Representation’ is defined as the extent to which the relevant
licensing body currently acts on behalf of, and holds the rights of, right holders in
relevant works of the type which will be the subject of the proposed ECL
Scheme.
In relation to the criterion of representativeness, the UK government agreed
with the generally held opinion of the stakeholders that the representativeness
test should be flexible, since requiring absolute thresholds could prevent ECL
schemes from emerging where they are needed most.76 In its Guidance For
Relevant Licensing Bodies Applying to run ECL Schemes, the UK government
writes:
To be significantly representative, the collective management organisa-
tion is expected to represent a very sizeable number of affected rights
holders. Conclusions about a collective management organisation’s
representation are unlikely to be reached if the collective management
organisation is unaware of the numbers of non-member rights holders
in the extended portion. Collective management organisations may
therefore wish to provide as evidence the total numbers of rights
holders affected by the ECL scheme, and demonstrate a transparent
methodology for how they arrived at that figure. A poor understanding
of total numbers may result in an incomplete publicity campaign, which
74 Eleonora Rosati, ‘‘The orphan works provisions of the ERR Act: are they compatible
with UK and EU laws?” (2013) E.I.P.R. 35(12) 724-740.
75 TheCopyright andRights inPerformances (ExtendedCollective Licensing)Regulations
2014, No. 2588, available at: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2014/
9780111116890>> [Copyright Board].
76 Lucie Guibault, ‘Cultural Heritage Online? Settle It in the Country of Origin of the
Work’, 6 (2015) JIPITEC 3, 173-191.
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in turn could mean that rights holders who want to opt out may not be
able to do so.77
According to the Regulations, the CMO must also show that it has the
support of a significant proportion of its members for the application ECL
scheme.
The UK legislator foresaw the possible occurrence of doubt regarding the
mandate of a CMO and this is why the (Extended Collective Licensing)
Regulations 2014 demand that the CMO has obtained the required consent from
its members to the proposed Extended Collective Licensing Scheme.78
The UK Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 confers on the copyright
owner the right to limit or exclude the grant of licences by virtue of the
regulations. The (Extended Collective Licensing) Regulations 2014 defines ‘‘opt
out arrangements” as the steps to be followed by a right holder to limit or
exclude the grant of licences under an Extended Collective Licensing Scheme.
This statement is completed by two provisions in the Regulations: article 5 (1)(g),
which requires evidence that arrangements have been made to allow non-
members to opt-out of an ECL scheme as well as the steps that are required to
actually opt out; and article 16 of the same regulations, which sets out in great
detail when and how a copyright owner may opt-out of an ECL scheme.
The regulations require that an ECL granting CMO take appropriate
measures to publicise the ECL scheme both before the introduction of the
scheme and during its life. The rationale behind this requirement is that all efforts
should be made to take adequate account of the interests of the non-members.
This translates in practice by publicising the scheme so as to locate non-members
and inform them of the possibility to either opt-out or receive individual
remuneration. The appropriateness of a scheme’s publicity arrangements will be
considered within the context of whether or not those arrangements are
proportionate. Appropriate measures may involve publicising the scheme in
countries where non-members are expected to be found. For the UK
government, this means that CMOs may have more targeted publicity
campaigns in territories where they are most active, whether or not there is a
reciprocal agreement with a collective management organisation in that
territory.79
Remarkably, only one CMO applied to the Secretary of State for approval of
a proposed ECL scheme, since the adoption of the Regulations in 2014. The
Copyright Licensing Agency (CLA) applied in December 2017 for authorisation
to operate an ECL scheme with the full support of its members, the Authors’
77 Intellectual Property Office (UK), ‘‘Extended Collective Licensing (ECL): Guidance for
relevant licensing bodies applying to run ECL schemes” (2016), UK Government, at 3
[ECL Guidance].
78 Copyright Board, supra note 75 art. 4(4)f).
79 Intellectual Property Office, ‘‘Guidance for relevant licensing bodies applying to run
ECL schemes” (2016), 14.
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Licensing and Collecting Scheme (ALCS), Publishers’ Licensing Services (PLS),
the Design and Artists Copyright Society (DACS), and the Picture Industry
Collecting Society for Effective Licensing (PICSEL).80 The essential idea of this
proposed ECL scheme was to authorize the CLA and its members to license and
collect payments for copying, scanning, distributing, or other uses of copyrighted
works, regardless of whether the creators are members of the organization or
have given their permission. The Secretary of State opened a public consultation
on the adequacy of the proposed arrangement.81 The National Writers Union
strongly opposed the plan, arguing that the scope of the ECL scheme was too
broad and would potentially deprive members from the possibility to license their
digital rights individually.82 The proposed scheme did not receive approval and
no other application has been filed since then.
iii. Directive 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market
The European copyright law framework expressly recognized the continued
existence of ECL regimes in several member states83, before introducing two
ECL related provisions in Directive (EU) 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital
Single Market.84 A first provision, article 8, deals with the licensing of out-of-
commerce works to cultural heritage institutions and a second provision, article
12, allows member states to implement a general ECL mechanism. The European
legislator has always shown a marked preference for licensing arrangements
80 Copyright Licensing Agency, (CLA) ‘‘ALCApplies for Extended Collective Licensing”
(7 December 2017) online: Copyright Licensing Agency <https://www.cla.co.uk/news-
cla-application-extended-collective-licensing>.
81 Intellectual Property Office, ‘‘Extended Collective Licensing (ECL): A consultation on
an application by the Copyright Licensing Agency (CLA) to operate an Extended
Collective Licensing (ECL) scheme” (2017) online:
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/665679/extended-collective-license.pdf>.(LINK IS BROKEN)**
82 Edward Hasbrouck, ‘‘NWU Opposes UK Scheme for ‘Extended Collective Licensing’
for Digital Rights”, National Writers Union (5 February 2018), online: <https://
nwu.org/nwu-opposes-uk-scheme-for-extended-collective-licensing-for-digital-rights/
>.
83 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting
and cable retransmission, OJ L 248, 6.10.1993, 15—21, art. 3; Directive 2001/29/EC of
the European Parliament and the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of
copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L. 167/10, 22.6.2001, recital
18; Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October
2012 on certain permitted uses of orphan works, OJ L 299, 27.10.2012, p. 5—12, recital
24;Directive 2014/26/EUof the European Parliament and of theCouncil of 26February
2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial
licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market OJ L 84,
20.3.2014, 72—98, recital 12.
84 Directive 2019/790, supra note 5 and amendingDirectives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, PE/
51/2019/REV/1OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, 92—125, art. 8 and 12.
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above the recognition of exceptions and limitations for granting permission to
make certain uses of copyright protected works.
In the case of out-of-commerce works, an ECL solution for the use of these
works by cultural heritage institutions was widely supported by all stakeholders,
from authors, to publishers and to the cultural heritage institutions themselves.85
Nevertheless, in the last phase of negotiating the directive, an exception was
inserted in the text to provide for the possibility to use certain types of works or
other subject matter for which no CMO that fulfils the condition set out in the
directive exists. Article 8 requires that member states establish an ECL
mechanism for the licensing of out-of-commerce works. The basic
characteristics of an ECL are immediately apparent in the provision, namely
the requirement of representativeness and equal treatment of all rights owners.
Article 8(4) codifies the right of withdrawal for all rights holders. Article 10 of
the Directive lays publicity obligations on cultural heritage institutions, CMOs
or relevant public authorities for the purposes of the identification of the out-of-
commerce works licensed under the ECL, as well as information about the
options available to rights holders under article 8(4), and information about the
licences themselves.
More interesting for the purposes of this article is article 12 of Directive (EU)
2019/790, which generally allows member states to provide, as far as the use on
their territory is concerned, that a collective licensing agreement for the
exploitation of works be extended to non-members, subject to the safeguards
provided for in the article. The extended licensing mechanism can only be applied
within well-defined areas of use, where obtaining authorisations from
rightholders on an individual basis is typically onerous and impractical to a
degree that makes the required licensing transaction unlikely, due to the nature
of the use or of the types of works concerned, and shall ensure that such licensing
mechanism safeguards the legitimate interests of rightholders. Such mechanisms
should be based on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria as
regards the treatment of rightholders, including rightholders who are not
members of the CMO.86 The conditions for a legitimate ECL regime are laid
down in paragraph 3, as follows:
(a) the collective management organisation is, on the basis of its mandates,
sufficiently representative of rightholders in the relevant type of works or
other subject matter and of the rights which are the subject of the licence,
for the relevant Member State;
(b) all rightholders are guaranteed equal treatment, including in relation to
the terms of the licence;
(c) rightholders who have not authorised the organisation granting the
licence may at any time easily and effectively exclude their works or other
85 See Lucie Guibault, ‘Cultural Heritage Online? Settle It in the Country of Origin of the
Work’, 6 (2015) JIPITEC 3, 173-191.
86 Directive 2019/790, supra note 5 recital 47.
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subject matter from the licensing mechanism established in accordance
with this Article; and
(d) appropriate publicity measures are taken, starting from a reasonable
period before the works or other subject matter are used under the
licence, to inform rightholders about the ability of the collective
management organisation to license works or other subject matter,
about the licensing taking place in accordance with this Article and
about the options available to rightholders as referred to in point (c).
Publicity measures shall be effective without the need to inform each
rightholder individually.
Recitals 44 to 50 provide additional insight into the intention of the
European legislator with respect to the establishment of ECL schemes. Worth
pointing out in the context of online music streaming services, is recital 45 which
emphasises that:
[e]xtended collective licensing by collective management organisations
and similar mechanisms can make it possible to conclude agreements in
those areas where collective licensing based on an authorisation by
rightholders does not provide an exhaustive solution for covering all
works or other subject matter to be used. Such mechanisms comple-
ment collective management of rights based on individual authorisation
by rightholders, by providing full legal certainty to users in certain
cases. At the same time, they provide an opportunity to rightholders to
benefit from the legitimate use of their works.
With respect to the criterion of representativeness, recital 48 specifies that:
Member States should determine the requirements to be satisfied for
those organisations to be considered sufficiently representative, taking
into account the category of rights managed by the organisation, the
ability of the organisation to manage the rights effectively, the creative
sector in which it operates, and whether the organisation covers a
significant number of rightholders in the relevant type of works or
other subject matter who have given a mandate allowing the licensing
of the relevant type of use.
Through recital 49 of Directive 2019/790 the European lawmaker puts a limit
on the ability to operate a licence under an ECL mechanisms, namely that the
CMO be subject to national law implementing Directive 2014/26/EU. Although
recital 49 does not explain the reason for this restriction, it is arguably to avoid
that a foreign CMO that is not bound by the obligations of good governance set
out in Directive 2014/26/EC operate on the same market. A competing foreign
CMO in a single market could have a negative impact on the representativeness
of the local CMO and would make the administration of the conditions for a
legitimate ECL more burdensome for all parties.
The deadline for the implementation of the provisions of the Directive in the
national law of the member states is June 7th, 2021.
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4. APPLYING ECLs TO ONLINE MUSIC STREAMING SERVICES
Based on the survey of the licensing of copyright and related rights for online
music streaming services in Section 2 and on the description of the key elements
and criteria of an ECL regime as put in place in countries of Europe in Section 3,
this section analyses the hurdles that the establishment of an ECL regime for the
licensing of online streaming services might encounter in Canada. The first
challenge, and probably the biggest, revolves around the issue of the
representativeness of CMOs; the second deals with the safeguards to be
guaranteed to non-members; the third concerns the potential role of the
Copyright Board of Canada; and the last and possibly the least pressing, relates
to the compliance of ECL regimes with international obligations.
(a) Representativeness of CMO
In order to be able to legitimately extend the application of a license
agreement to non-members, a CMO must demonstrate that it represents the
rights on a ’substantial’ or ’significant’ portion of the repertoire it licenses. For
an online music streaming service that aims to make a worldwide repertoire
available to its subscribers, the legitimacy of the ECL system must therefore
account for both the national and foreign repertoire. There is no clear criterion
or measure for the assessment of the representative character of a CMO. In our
opinion, the representativeness of the CMO granting the ECL must therefore be
determined by three essential cumulative factors: 1) the number of rights owners
directly represented by the national CMO granting the streaming license; 2) the
number of agreements with foreign CMOs representing rights owners in the same
category; and 3) the correspondence of legal mandates between CMOs, e.g.
whether CMOs bound by reciprocal agreements do in fact manage the same
categories of rights. Each factor is examined in turn below.
Dealing first with the third factor on the legal mandate given to the CMOs,
certified Tariff 22.A - Internet - Online Music Services applies to services like
Spotify and others. We assume on this basis that the SOCAN is entrusted by its
members with the administration of the right of communication to the public by
telecommunication, which includes in this case on-demand music streaming.87
CSI (e.g. SODRAC and CMRRA) has applied for the approval of a Tariff for
online music services which would cover interactive services.88 While this Tariff
application is still pending, we infer from it that CSI does hold the necessary
rights from its members to license these on to users.
The issue of the legal mandate of CMOs is the thorniest in relation to the
rights of performing artists. Is Re:Sound entitled to license any rights of the
performing artists or record producers for the online, interactive, music
87 SOCAN Tariff 22.A (Online Music Services), 2007-2010 online: <https://cb-cda.gc.ca/
tariffs-tarifs/certified-homologues/2012/Tarif-SOCAN22A.pdf>.
88 CSI Commercial Radio Tariff 2018, online: <https://cb-cda.gc.ca/tariffs-tarifs/pro-
posed-proposes/2017/TAR-20170526.pdf>.
EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSING 243
streaming services? From the information available on the website of the
Copyright Board, we see that the Quebec counterpart to Re:Sound, Artisti, had
applied, but later withdrew, a demand for the approval of a Tariff for theMaking
Available to the Public, Communication to the Public by Telecommunication and
Reproduction of Performances Fixed in a Sound Recording by Online Music
Services (2019-2021).89 No comparable Tariff application was made by
Re:Sound or by any other member (MROC or CONNECT). Re:Sound’s legal
mandate is in all likelihood limited to non-interactive acts of communication to
the public by telecommunication. This situation is not unique: no other related
rights society elsewhere in Europe or the USA has, to our knowledge, acquired
the necessary rights to grant licences for the making available of sound
recordings to the public. For this reason, it is our opinion that an ECL
mechanism for the licensing of related rights for online, interactive, streaming
services is simply impossible at this time. The first step that Re:Sound would
need to take, would be to acquire the mandate to act in this area.
With respect to the copyrights in musical works, the national CMO must be
representative of a ’substantial’ number of rights owners holding rights on the
types of works covered by the extended licence. In the Canadian context, there is
little doubt that SOCAN is representative of music authors and publishers, at
least with respect to the administration of the right of public performance.
SOCAN states that over 150,000 songwriters, composers, and music publishers
are its direct members. SODRAC, by contrast, represents more than 9,000
authors, composers, and publishers in Canada. SODRAC’s membership can
appear quite low in comparison to SOCAN’s, but this is not surprising if we
consider that the vast majority of published authors transfer their mechanical
rights to a music publisher. The proportion of individual composers who are
members of SODRAC is correspondingly much lower. This by no means
suggests that SODRAC is not representative at the national level. By contrast, t
is unclear how many members have joined the CMRRA. Also unclear is the
number of non-represented music publishers there are in Canada. As the UK
Guidance for relevant licensing bodies applying to run ECL points out, the CMO
should be aware of the numbers of non-member rights holders there are in the
extended portion.90
On the national CMO market, the representative character of a CMO could
be affected if more than one organization is authorized to conclude ECL
agreements within a certain field on a particular territory.91 If more than one
organization were eligible, this could create confusion on the part of non-
members as to where to claim remuneration as well as confusion on part of the
89 Online Music Services Tariff (ARTISTI 2019-2021), online: <https://cb-cda.gc.ca/
tariffs-tarifs/proposed-proposes/2018/ARTISTI-19052018.pdf>.
90 ECL Guidance, supra note 77.
91 Daniel Gervais, ‘‘Application of an Extended Collective Licensing Regimee in Canada:
Principles and Issues Related to Implementations”(2003) Department of Canadian
Heritage at 35 [Gervais].
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users as to which works each organization administers.92 The Nordic countries
generally admit that more than one organization can be eligible, but in such a
case, the organizations are presumed to cooperate. Legal certainty and
predictability are created to some extent by the fact that any representative
organization must be approved by the Ministry responsible for the Copyright Act
before they can be eligible to conclude an ECL. In addition, the Ministry
responsible for approving a CMO may lay down rules on good governance and
transparency of the organization.93 When several organizations are approved to
grant a license for a given use of works, the terms of the approved decisions shall
ensure, where needed, that the licenses are granted simultaneously and on
compatible terms. With respect to the licensing of mechanical rights, the
Canadian collective rights management market is occupied primarily by CSI,
which is a joint venture of the CMRRA and the SODRAC. The potential issue of
having two CMOs in the area of mechanical rights in Canada should not create a
problem, since they clearly cooperate with each other.
Especially with respect to services using a worldwide repertoire, like Spotify,
Apple, Amazon, or Deezer, it is essential that the ECL granting CMO be also
representative of foreign rights holders whose works are licensed on the
Canadian territory. A CMO will need to show that it has signed reciprocal
agreements with foreign entities that represent the rights on the works covered by
the ECL. SOCAN is a member of the Confédération Internationale des Sociétés
d’Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs de Musique (CISAC). Although this list is
not available on its website, SOCAN boasts of having reciprocal agreements with
over 90 different performing rights organizations (PROs) around the world.94
SOCAN’s representativeness vis-à-vis foreign rights holders is undeniable.
Rather, the question here is whether SOCAN experiences such difficulty in
licensing the digital performing right to online streaming services that an ECL
model would bring benefits above the current voluntary licensing mechanism.
SODRAC is a member of the Bureau International de l’édition mécanique
(BIEM). Figure 1 below is a screenshot taken from SODRAC’s website which
shows a portion of the foreign partners with whom SODRAC has concluded an
agreement. A sharp eye will notice that not all agreements with sister
organisations are of the same nature: some are reciprocal, meaning that both
CMOs represent each other’s repertoires on their respective territories. Others
carry the mention ’Represents SODRAC’s repertoire’ (presumably on the foreign
territory of that CMO), and yet others state that the organisation is ’represented
by SODRAC’ (presumably on the Canadian territory). Remarkably,
SODRAC’s agreements with the organisations representing the Anglo-
92 Thomas Riis and Jens Schovsbo, ‘‘Extended Collective Licenses and the Nordic
Experiences— It’s aHybrid but is It a Volvo or a Lemon?” (2010) 33:4 Columbia J. Law
Arts at 493. [Riis and Schovsbo].
93 Axhamn and Guibault, supra note 6 at 34.
94 The Toolbox, ‘‘What is a Reciprocal Agreement”, online: SOCAN <https://www.so-
can.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/socan-reciprocal-agreements-en-2017.pdf>.
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Australian-American repertoire (APRA-AMCOS, Harry Fox Agency, and PRS
for Music) are not reciprocal: the foreign organisations have the mandate to
represent the Canadian repertoire on their territory, but not the other way
around. In other words, SODRAC’s agreement with these organisations do not
entitle it to represent the foreign repertoire on the Canadian territory.
Figure 1 - Reciprocal agreements between SODRAC and sister CMO’s - https://
sodrac.ca/en/partners-music
Does this affect SODRAC’s representativeness? Quite possibly, yes. If
SODRAC is not entrusted by the foreign CMOs to represent on the Canadian
territory the mechanical rights on the Australian, English or American
repertoire, it cannot grant a licence with respect to those works. Presumably,
the rights are licensed in Canada directly by the music publishers.
With respect to mechanical rights, there is no information available
regarding the foreign reciprocal representation arrangements that the CMRRA
might have concluded. Consequently, CMRRA’s representativeness is a mystery.
Knowing how the management market has exploded in recent years, with the
emergence of third-party distributors and independent publishers, it is also
unclear how many national and foreign music authors and publishers exist, who
are not members of either SODRAC or CMRRA.
For a legitimate ECL to be set up for the licensing of mechanical rights for
online, interactive, music streaming services, more information would be
required regarding the representative character of CSI vis-à-vis nonpublished
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authors in Canada and all types of rights owners in other countries. If research
shows that there is an important proportion of non-represented authors and
music publishers, this may prevent the creation of a legitimate ECL system. Not
only would this affect the representativeness of the CMO, but it would affect the
strength of the licence for the user, like Deezer, Spotify, and others, as it would
raise the risk that too many rights owners would want to exercise the right of
withdrawal or claim a separate remuneration.
(b) Safeguards for Non-Members
The implementation of a proper ECL regime would demand that the
Canadian Copyright Act be amended not only to make the freely negotiated
agreement between the CMO and the user binding on all non-represented rights
owners in the same category, but also to recognize certain safeguards for non-
members.95 As discussed in Section 2 above, two key safeguards that should be
put in place are the right of non-members to withdraw from the specific scheme
and to receive separate remuneration for the proven use of their works. These
two rights would be stronger if they were indeed introduced in the legislation,
rather than left at the discretion of the parties to the agreement.
In practice, provisions would need to be made regarding the withdrawal
method. Withdrawal is in theory only open to the actual rights owner. Knowing
that most published authors have transferred their mechanical rights to the
publisher/producer, they would clearly not be entitled to withdraw their songs
from Spotify, Deezer, or the rest. The authorization of the publisher/producer
would be required. On the other hand, the withdrawal method should allow
nonpublished authors to easily opt-out of the ECL scheme without undue
burden. Any ongoing use should be terminated within a reasonable period.
Following the model of the UK (Extended Collective Licensing) Regulations
2014, the law could require that when a non-member rights holder withdraws
their works, the CMO must inform licensees of (i) the names of those works, and
(ii) when the works will be removed from the ECL scheme. CMOs are required to
update a list of opted out rights holders and works.
Unrepresented right holders should be given the possibility to claim
individual remuneration for the proven use of their music work, by advancing
a claim against the CMO. Here also, rules should be laid down to determine
within which deadline a claim can be made and what evidence must be adduced
to obtain separate payment.
These rights should be accompanied by an obligation on all parties to take
appropriate measures to publicize the ECL regime in every country where a non-
negligible proportion of non-members is expected to exist. The (Extended
Collective Licensing) Regulations 2014, and article 12(3) of the Directive (EU)
2019/790 provide a good illustration of how safeguards can be enacted in the law
to protect the interests of the non-members. Article 12 (3)(d) of the Directive
95 Gervais, supra note 91 at 29.
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requires for instance that appropriate publicity measures be taken, starting from
a reasonable period before the works are used under the licence, to inform
rightholders about the ability of the CMO to license works about the licensing
taking place and about the options available to rightholders to obtain separate
remuneration. Publicity measures must be effective without the need to inform
each rightholder individually.
(c) Role of Copyright Board of Canada
One of the major benefits of the ECL model, in comparison with a
compulsory license, is that it is based on free negotiations and thus presupposes
mutual consent from the CMO and the user. However, the advantage of ECL
over a compulsory license rests on the assumption that the market of collective
agreements functions well in practice. In other words, it is based on the
assumption that the users and the CMO are prepared to conclude agreements so
that the intended use can be carried out. The underlying premise to a legitimate
ECL regime rests on the capacity of CMOs to function well, be accountable and
transparent, and act on a non-discriminatory basis. In the Nordic countries,
there is a strong tradition of cooperation between CMOs and other parties. In
Europe, rules on the good governance of CMOs have been introduced through
the adoption of Directive 2014/26/EU on the Collective Management of
Rights.96
In Canada, the oversight of CMOs and their tariffs occurs through the
Copyright Board. The Board could, in principle, play a role at different levels
with regards to the implementation of ECLs in the Canadian licensing landscape.
For one thing, since the Canadian copyright system does not require any
approval from a public body for the creation of a collective society, the
Copyright Board could be called upon to verify the representativeness of a CMO
before it begins issuing extended collective licences.97
The Board could of course play a role in approving tariffs, setting conditions
to the ECL or arbitrating disputes between the CMO and the users about the
conditions of use. Such a task would fall squarely within the Board’s remit, as the
Board sees itself as an economic regulatory body empowered to establish, either
mandatorily or at the request of an interested party, the royalties to be paid for
the use of copyrighted works, when the administration of such copyright is
entrusted to a collective administration society.
But the Board could also be called upon to supervise the relationship
between the CMO and the non-members. The Board could intervene where a
non-member wishes to exercise their right to individual remuneration. Such
remuneration would have to be negotiated between the rights holders and the
96 Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February
2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial
licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market OJ L 84,
20.3.2014, at 72—98.
97 Gervais, supra note 91 at 33.
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CMO. If the CMO and the non-member fail to agree on an acceptable level of
remuneration, they would presumably turn to the Copyright Board to mediate
the dispute.98 Finally, the Board could also oversee the efforts undertaken to
publicize the ECL scheme among non-members.
These last two tasks may not fall within the normal ambit of the Board’s
activities, as they concern the relationship between the CMO and a rights owner.
To give effective support in this respect, the mandate of the Board would
probably need to be broadened to cover this side of the CMOs’ activities.
(d) Compliance with International Obligations
As long as ECLs have existed, the issue of the compliance of ECL schemes
with international obligations in the area of copyright law have shed a lot of ink.
There is now a convincing body of literature that examines the question of
whether an ECL scheme encroaches upon the minimum requirements of the
Berne Convention, namely the prohibition on formalities and the three-step-
test.99 The general opinion has evolved over time towards the non-
controversiality of this issue. This subsection will therefore very briefly
summarize the issues and assess whether ECLs risk being found non-compliant.
i. Prohibition on Formalities
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention prohibits contracting parties to subject
the enjoyment and exercise of copyright to any formality. According to the legal
literature, clearly prohibited examples of formalities include obligations to
deposit works with state institutions (such as libraries), the requirement of a
notice of authorship on the work, or the registration of the work with a public
body and the renewal thereof, as a pre-condition for obtaining protection.100 A
rule of copyright law that made protection dependent on membership in certain
organizations would also be considered a violation of the Berne Convention. The
question is whether the act of withdrawal from the application of an ECL
agreement by a non-member violates the prohibition in Article 5(2) because the
opting out might constitute a ’formality’ for the exercise of copyright.
Ficsor reviews the literature on the subject and concludes as follows:
98 Gervais, supra note 91 at 30.
99 Alen-Savikko and Knapstad, supra note 61 at 90; Mihaly Ficsor, ‘‘Collective Rights
Management from theViewpoint of International Treaties, with SpecialAttention to the
EU ’Acquis’” (2016) in D. Gervais (ed.), 3rd ed., Kluwer Law International 31 [Ficsor];
Jane C. Ginsburg, ‘‘Extended Collective Licenses in International Treaty Perspective:
Issues and Statutory Implementation” (2017)Columbia Public LawResearch PaperNo.
14-564 [Ginsburg];AxhamnandGuibault, supranote 6 at 47;Riis andSchovsbo, supranote
92 at 483; Gervais, supra note 91 at 19.
100 Ibid. For a thorough analysis of the prohibitions on formalities in relation to the ‘‘opt
out” requirement in someECLprovisions, see Stef vanGompel, Formalities inCopyright
Law. An Analysis of Their History, Rationales and Possible Future, Kluwer Law
International, 2011, at 188 ff.
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A duly established extended collective management - fulfilling the four
above-discussed conditions - is an enabler of due application of certain
rights for the exercise of which collective management is indispensable
or highly desirable. Rightholders do enjoy the right involved which is
exercised in their interest by the CMO in accordance with the
legislator’s presumption that it is the only practicable way to enjoy it.
If certain rightholders still try to exercise the right individually and opt
out, it is a kind of ’rebuttal’, in their case, of the presumption on which
the legislators have provided for an extended effect.101
We are satisfied that if an ECL were to be set up in Canada for the licensing
of mechanical rights for the online, interactive, streaming of music works, the
right of withdrawal would not amount to a prohibited formality, as we know
that the Canadian legislator would take all measures necessary to ensure that the
key elements of a legitimate ECL scheme would be fulfilled.
ii. Compliance with the Three-Step Test
The question of whether an ECL provision is an exception on the non-
member’s copyright has also been discussed in the legal literature.102 From the
perspective of the non-member, an ECL could be construed under certain
circumstances as an exception, akin to a non-voluntary licence, where the rights
owner cannot oppose the use of their work. In relation to this, the most
important restriction on the adoption of an exception is the so-called three-step
test. The test is laid down in article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, article 10 of
WIPO Copyright Treaty, and article 13 of TRIPS.103 The wording of these three
international instruments differs slightly, but generally the three-step test holds
that a contracting state must confine limitations or exceptions of the exclusive
rights to i) certain special cases, ii) which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work, and iii) do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder. As the test only applies to limitations and
exceptions, the question is whether an ECL provision qualifies as either one of
them.
As Gervais points out in his 2003 study, the ECL system is not a non-
voluntary licence, for two obvious reasons:
1. The CMOs that benefit from the extended collective license are those
that have asked for (and obtained) it from the competent administrative
authority, which leads to the assumption that the CMO has consulted
its members (or the rights holders that it represents) and has obtained
their agreement and that they are of the opinion that an extension of
the collective licence is in the interest of all rights holders in the
category concerned.
101 Ficsor, supra note 99 at 77 [emphasis in original].
102 Riis and Schovsbo, supra note 92 at 487 ff.
103 At EU level it is enshrined in article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29/EC.
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2. All non-member (or non-represented) rights holders can easily
exclude themselves. Excluded rights holders can even benefit from an
improved plan, as explained below.104
For the same reason and subject to the same conditions as given in relation
to the prohibition on formalities, Ficsor rejects the statement that ECLs qualify
as exceptions.105 Ficsor sees ECLs as enabling systems serving the fullest possible
enjoyment of a right in situations where transaction costs would make individual
licensing impossible or undesirable. Of course, as Gervais106 and Ginsburg107
highlight in their publications, the implementation of proper safeguards for the
non-members, e.g. the principle of equal treatment, the recognition of a separate
right to remuneration and the possibility to withdraw, are the necessary
conditions to make ECL regimes compliant with international norms. In such
circumstances, there is therefore no need to submit the licensing regime to the
conditions of the three-step test of article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
5. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether a system of ECL could
be feasible in Canada for the licensing of performing rights and mechanical rights
to online, interactive, music streaming services like Spotify, Deezer, Amazon,
and Apple. To answer this question, we first examined how rights are currently
being licensed to such services by CMOs and other entities in the European
Union, the United States, and Canada. This revealed an interesting portrait of
the role of CMOs in the three jurisdictions. One important observation to make
from this survey is that the digital licensing market in these jurisdictions is highly
fragmented, especially with respect to mechanical copyright and related rights, as
it counts various new forms of licensing entities. We also found that the CMOs
representing related rights owners probably do not have a mandate to license
digital, interactive rights on the sound recordings.
Next, we described the main features of an ECL scheme, which include the
following:
1) The CMO and the user conclude an agreement on the basis of free
negotiations;
2) The CMO is representative of a substantial number of rights holders in the
field of activity;
3) The agreement is made legally binding on non-represented rights holders;
4) The user obtains a blanket licence to use all materials without fear of
facing individual claims or criminal sanctions;
104 Gervais, supra note 91 at 17.
105 Ficsor, supra note 99 at 74-75.
106 Gervais, supra note 91 at 17.
107 Ginsburg, supra note 99 at 9.
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5) Non-represented rights holders have a right to separate, individual
remuneration; and
6) Non-represented rights holders have a right to withdraw their repertoire
from the application of the ECL.
To get a concrete idea of how ECLs work in reality, we discussed the
practical experience with this licensing model of the Nordic countries, the United
Kingdom, and the European Union. For this part, we focused primarily on the
criterion of representativeness of the CMOs and on the safeguards for non-
members. This is because we felt that if there is any doubt about the feasibility of
this system, it would be in relation to these factors.
Combining the findings of the two first parts of this study, we then assessed
whether a system of extended collective licensing (ECL) would be feasible in
Canada for the licensing of performing rights and mechanical rights to online,
interactive, music streaming services. With respect to related rights, the answer is
simple: no. This is because to our understanding CMOs in this field do not hold
the necessary rights. By contrast, an ECL for the copyright owner’s right of
communication to the public by telecommunication would most definitely be
feasible, since the SOCAN is representative in its field. There, the question might
be whether such a model would bring any advantage above the current situation.
With respect to the copyright owner’s mechanical rights administered by CSI, the
answer is not unequivocal: for a legitimate ECL to be set up for the licensing of
mechanical rights for online, interactive, music streaming services, more
information would be required regarding the representative character of CSI
vis-à-vis non published authors in Canada and all types of rights owners in other
countries. Finally, we also considered what safeguards should be implemented to
protect the interests of the non-members and what role the Copyright Board of
Canada could be called to play in relation to an ECL scheme.
As a last thought, it may be worth pointing out the alternatives to ECLs
proposed by Koskinen-Olsson and Sigurdardottir to facilitate the licensing of
works that could be considered for online, interactive, music streaming services.
A first option is to incorporate into a license granted by a CMO an indemnity
clause by which the organization assumes the liability for the payment of
remuneration to a non-member. The authors point out that this option does not
enable the use of non-represented works. While it does eliminate financial
liability under civil law, it does not take away possible liability under criminal
law. A second option is to enact a provision in the Copyright Act by which a
CMO is given a general authorization to represent all right holders for the
category of rights that they normally administer or that creates a presumption to
that effect. The effect of this solution is similar to the ECL but offers less
safeguards to the rights holders. A third option is to set up a compulsory
collective licensing system, as the American’s have through the Music
Modernization Act of 2018. In such a case, the collective management of an
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exclusive right remains voluntary, but once the right holders choose to join, they
cannot make claims on an individual basis.108
108 Koskinen-Olsso and Knapstad, supra note 57 at 253.
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